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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the real (direct) and financial crowding out in India between 1970–71 
and 2002–03. Using an asymmetric vector autoregressive (VAR) model, the paper finds 
no real crowding out between public and private investment; rather, complementarity is 
observed between the two. The dynamics of financial crowding out is captured through the 
dual transmission mechanism via the real rate of interest—that is, whether private capital 
formation is interest-rate sensitive and, in turn, whether the rise in the real rate of interest 
is induced by a fiscal deficit. The study found empirical evidence for the former but not 
the latter, supporting the conclusion that there is no financial crowding out in India. The 
differential impacts of public infrastructure and noninfrastruture innovations on the private 
corporate sector are carried out separately to analyze the nonhomogeneity aspects of public 
investment. The results of the Impulse Response Function reinforced that no other 
macrovariables, including cost and quantity of credit and the output gap, have been as 
significant as public investment—in particular, public infrastructure investment—in 
determining private corporate investment in the medium and long terms, which has crucial 
policy implications.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, in the context of macroeconomic management in India, it has often been 
argued that high fiscal deficit is affecting capital formation in the economy, both by 
reducing private investment through an increase in interest rate and also through reduction 
in public sector’s own investment arising out of ever increasing consumption expenditure.
1 
Also, the persistence of high fiscal deficits and ever increasing debt service payments are 
considered as one of the major constraints for the government at any level to undertake the 
necessary expenditures for productive capital formation. In other words, high fiscal deficit 
is affecting capital formation in the economy both by reducing private investment through 
an increase in interest rate and also through reduction in the public sector’s own 
investment arising out of ever-increasing consumption expenditure.  
The taxonomy of crowding out—real and financial—has been treated in detail in 
theoretical literature (Blinder and Solow 1973; Buiter 1990). The real (direct) crowding 
out occurs when the increase in public investment displaces private capital formation 
broadly on a dollar-for-dollar basis, irrespective of the mode of financing the fiscal 
deficit. The financial crowding out is the phenomenon of partial loss of private capital 
formation, due to the increase in the interest rates emanating from the preemption of real 
and financial resources by the government through bond financing of fiscal deficit.
2 Many 
authors have empirically tested the real (direct) crowding out and found contradictory 
results. Ramirez (1994), Greene and Villanueva (1990), Buiter (1977), Aschauer (1989), 
and Erenburg (1993) found that public investment and private investment have a 
complementary relationship; while Blejer and Khan (1984), Cebula (1978), Shafik (1992), 
Parker (1995), Ostrosky (1979), Tun Wai and Wong (1982), Sunderrajan and Takur 
(1980), Pradhan, et al. (1990), Krishnamurty (1985), Kulkarni and Balders (1998), and 
Alsenia, et al. (2002) did find evidence for crowding out between public and private 
investment (Appendix 1). The common analogy for the former set of studies is that 
increases in public capital formation stimulate aggregate demand and, in turn, increase 
private investment. Another link for the existence of this complementary relationship is 
that a higher stock of public capital (in particular, infrastructure) may increase the return 
of private investment projects. The latter set of studies on crowding out argued that public 
investment might act as a substitute for private investment. This substitutability can arise 
when the private sector utilizes public capital for its required purposes rather than to 
                                                             
1 Economic Survey, Government of India (2001a) and the Report of Economic Advisory Council (2001).    3
expand private capacity.
3  
The general criticism about these studies on crowding out is that they fail to look 
into the aspects of the financial crowding out. Unlike in the case of real (direct) crowding 
out, empirical investigation of the financial crowding out is not straightforward and 
simple. The financial crowding out can be empirically established through a dual 
mechanism via rate of interest; firstly, whether private investment is interest rate sensitive 
and secondly, whether the rate of interest is induced by fiscal deficit. This two-fold 
analysis is significant because even if private investment is interest rate sensitive, this 
aspect by itself does not mean occurrence of financial crowding out if rate of interest is not 
deficit induced.
4  
Apart from this, many of these studies confined the analysis of real (direct) 
crowding out to the aggregate level of public investment, neglecting whether the 
infrastructure and noninfrastructure mix of public capital formation has differential 
impacts on private capital formation. Also, most of these studies suffer from acute 
methodological deficiencies, as they assumed the respective time-series to be stationary 
and proceeded the analysis by applying ordinary least squares. In other words, earlier 
studies have failed to address that time series may contain unit root and be nonstationary at 
levels (which can lead to spurious regression results) that would yield inconsistent 
estimates.  
This paper examines real (direct) and financial crowding out in the context of India 
over the last four decades. This study is different from the existing studies on crowding 
out in India for four reasons. Firstly, the study bridged the lacuna of partial analysis status 
of financial crowding out in India by analyzing not only whether private investment is 
interest rate sensitive, but also whether the rise in interest rate is deficit-induced. Secondly, 
after correcting for unit roots and cointegration, the problems of simultaneity and ad hoc 
specification of lag structure are also eliminated in this paper by applying Hsiao’s 
asymmetric vector autoregressive framework. Thirdly, the aspects related to 
nonhomogeneity of public investment are captured through separate model specifications 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Buiter (1990) also discussed the taxonomy of real (direct) and financial crowding out in detail. 
3 Alternately, higher private investment can result in lower public capital formation; for instance, firms 
might construct physical infrastructure (such as roads and bridges) themselves, thereby allowing the public 
sector to withhold from this investment. In other words, there exists a forward and backward linkage 
between private and public investment.  
4 This is because the ad hoc configurations of demand and supply of loanable funds in the market is affected 
by myriad factors and these factors may have their respective role in the determination of rate of interest. 
But, from the perspective of the financial crowding out hypothesis, what is relevant is the extent to which the   4
incorporating public infrastructure investment and noninfrastructure investment. Fourthly, 
as the interest rate was administered till recently in India, whether the administered rate of 
interest reflects the market signals became the pertinent question that thwarted any attempt 
on financial crowding out in the context of India. This problem is tackled in this paper by 
decomposing the rate of interest series to understand the inflationary expectations intrinsic 
in it and tries to analyze whether the real rate of interest shows a varying trend along with 
the inflationary expectations in the intertemporal scale. The point to be noted here is that 
although the nominal rate of interest showed a nonvarying trend, particularly during the 
administered interest rate regime in India, it may not be so when it comes to the real rate 
of interest series. Real rate of interest showed substantial volatility intertemporally. This, 
in turn, validates that rate of interest (though administered) reflects market signals. 
The paper has been divided into five sections. Apart from the introduction, Section 
2 discusses the theoretical framework of the study. Section 3 interprets the data and 
Section 4 discusses the econometric results. Section 5 summarizes the major findings of 
the paper and draws conclusions.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CROWDING OUT  
 
Though the neoclassical-flexible accelerator model has been the most widely accepted 
general theory of investment behavior, the application of these models in the context of 
developing countries posed certain challenges due to the key assumptions of the models, 
such as perfect capital markets and little or no government investment (Greene and 
Villanueva 1990). With the relatively significant role of government in the capital 
formation in developing countries, the standard models of investment could not be directly 
adapted to developing countries. Furthermore, even if standard models could be directly 
adapted to developing countries, severe data constraints arise when attempts are made to 
implement them empirically (Blejer and Khan 1984).
5 Given these constraints, this paper 
attempts to develop a model for private investment in the context of India in line with the 
existing attempts to model private investment in the context of developing countries, 
primarily using neoclassical-flexible accelerator models.
6 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rate of interest is induced by the fiscal deficit operations of the government and, in turn, the extent to which 
such increase in the rate of interest adversely affect the level of private capital formation.  
5 However, certain studies [for instance, Sunderrajan and Takur (1980); Tun Wai and Wong (1982); Shafik 
(1992); and Blejer and Khan (1984)] have attempted to incorporate features of standard accelerator and 
neoclassical models of investment through relaxation of the basic assumptions underlying these models. 
6 For instance, Blejer and Khan (1984) and Tun Wai and Wong (1982).    5
Theoretically, gross investment in the private sector is defined equal to net 
investment in the private sector plus depreciation of the previous capital stock, while net 
investment in the private sector is defined as the difference between the desired stock of 
capital in period t and the actual stock in the previous period t-1.  
 
1 − + ∆ = t t pvt KP KP I δ          ( 1 )  
where Ipvt = gross private investment    
∆KPt = Npvt = net private investment 
δ = rate of depreciation  
) ( 1
*
− − = ∆ = t t t pvt KP KP KP N β        ( 2 )  
 where 
*
t KP = desired stock of capital in private sector 
 KPt-1 = actual stock of capital in private sector in the previous period. 
   β = coefficient of adjustment, 0≤β≤ 1 
 
Substituting equation (2) in (1), we get: 
 
1 1
* ) ( − − + − = t t t pvt KP KP KP I δ β       (3) 
 
In the standard lag-operator notation, equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
t pvt KP L I ] ) 1 ( 1 [ δ − − =        (4) 
  where L is the lag operator, LKPt=KPt-1.  
  
Now, we specify a partial adjustment function for gross investment as follows: 
  
) ( ) 1 (
*
) ( ) ( − − = ∆ t pvt t pvt t pvt I I I β        (5) 
 
where I*pvt(t) is the desired level of private investment. In the steady state, desired private 
investment is given by:
7 
 
* * ] ) 1 ( 1 [ t pvt KP L I δ − − =        (6) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
7 This equation requires that KP*t-1 = KPt-1.This equality would generally hold in the steady state.    6




) ( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ − − + − − = t pvt t t pvt I KP L I β δ β      ( 7 )    
 
    
We know that in the accelerator models, desired stock of capital can be assumed to be 
proportional to the output expectations in the economy. 
 
* *




t Y  is the expected output  in the economy.
8  




) ( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ − − + − − = t pvt t t pvt I Y L I β δ βα      (9) 
 
The beta coefficient in the equation, which captures the response of private 
investment to the gap between desired and actual investment, is, in turn, assumed to vary 
systematically with the economic factors that influence the ability of private investors to 
achieve the desired level of investment. This paper hypothesizes that the response of 
private investment depends on the availability of financing (cost and quantity of credit, 
viz., ir and Cpvt) and the level of public sector investment (Ipub).
9  
 
) , , { pub r pvt I i C f = β
                    (10) 
A linear regression model for private investment can thus be constructed assuming 
equations (9) and (10) are linear.  
 
t pvt r pub pvt pvt Y b C b i b I b I b a I ν + + + + + + = − * 5 4 3 2 ) 1 ( 1             (11) 
Before econometrically estimating equation (11), the next section interprets the 
data in the context of India related to these macrovariables.  
 
                                                             
8 The paper follows the assumption of Blejer and Khan (1984) that private sector investment depends on 
output expectations of the economy, not in the private sector alone. Blejer and Khan (1984) also noted that 
private sector output is proportional to total output.  
9 Blejer and Khan (1984) hypothesized that the beta coefficient depends on: (i) the stage of economic cycle; 
(ii) the availability of financing; and (iii) the level of public sector investment. While Tun Wai and Wong   7
3. INTERPRETING DATA 
 
Data on capital formation in public and private sectors is drawn from the new series of 
National Account Statistics published by Central Statistical Organisation. Data on other 
macrovariables of study (rate of interest, rate of inflation, the availability of credit to 
private sector, gross domestic product, gross fiscal deficit, exchange rate, and money 
supply) are drawn from various issues of the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 
published by Reserve Bank of India. The period of analysis is between 1970–71 to 2002–
03. 
In the context of India, for the estimation of capital formation, the economy is 
divided into three broad institutional sectors—public sector, private corporate sector, and 
household sector. The household sector is conceived as the “residual” sector, embracing 
all economic entities other than the units of public and private corporate sector, essentially 
as clubbing together the leftover or the unknown of all units.
10 In the light of these data 
problems, it should be noted that the household investment data is not entirely reliable and 
kept outside the purview of private investment in this paper. The gross capital formation 
noted a declining trend in the public sector, especially in the late 1990s, while private 






















                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1982) hypothesized that the beta coefficient depends positively on the change in bank credit to the private 
sector and net capital inflow to the private sector.  
10 The sources of data used in the estimation of household share are varied and divergent and, as a result, the 
estimates contain indeterminate sources of errors. In other words, the measured trend in decrease/increase in 
household investment rates can be a statistical artifact, likely due to the overestimation/underestimation of 
private corporate investment (Little and Joshi 1994).   8
Figure 1: Trends in Public Investment and Private Corporate Investment as a 























The public sector played a significant role in the investment process in the 1970s, 
which is around the peak of approximately 10 percent of GDP; and then in the mid-1980s 
it grew further to around 12 percent of GDP before it declined to 6 percent of GDP in late 
1990s. The private corporate sector, which was only 2.44 percent of GDP in 1970–71, had 
gained momentum in the 1980s and reached around 6 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s 
when the public investment was as high as 12 percent of GDP. The private corporate 
investment crossed over the public investment in terms of GDP in the early 1990s and 
reached a peak of 9.57 percent of GDP in 1995–96, despite a marginal declining trend 
thereafter. The trends related to the dominance of the public sector were partially reversed 
after the burgeoning fiscal crisis of 1990s, which led to a retrenchment in public 
investment with a simultaneous expansion of private capital accumulation, emanating 
from the booming private corporate investment in a decade of industrial delicensing and 
trade liberalization.  
 
 
3.1  Nonhomogeneity of Public Investment  
The public capital formation in India is nonhomogeneous in nature and can be broadly 
divided into infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment. Following Parker (1995), 
public infrastructure investment is defined as the aggregate of capital formation in 
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public noninfrastructure is defined as capital formation in manufacturing, mining and 
quarrying, trade, hotels and restaurant, finance and insurance, etc.  
 
















Based on this classification, it is noted that the gap between both series widened in 
mid-1980s; however, both series showed a declining trend during the 1990s (Figure 2). It 
is interesting to note that the decline in public capital formation is more in the case of 
noninfrastructure investment than infrastructure investment since 1980s.  
In terms of crowding out, public investment—both infrastructure and 
noninfrastructure investment—is the most significant determinant of private capital 
formation. It is important to analyze whether different types of public investment are 
likely to have conflictive or mutually reinforcing effects on private capital formation; 
public investment in infrastructure, prima facie, tends to attract private investment, while 
public investment in noninfrastructural activities where public enterprises do what private 
firms can also do might have substitution effects. The comovements of public 
infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment with private corporate investment are 
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Figure 3: Comovements of Public Infrastructure and Noninfrastructure Investment 












Public infrastructure investment, which was 3.2 percent of GDP in 1970–71, had 
increased to 5.44 percent in 1986–87 and thereafter had noted a steady decline to 2.76 
percent of GDP in 2002–03. Private corporate investment on the other hand, though lower 
than public infrastructure investment in 1970–71 at 4.31 percent of GDP, had increased in 
due course to 6.84 percent of GDP in 1992–93. A prominent crossover of private 
corporate investment and public infrastructure investment was noted in 1991–92 when 
infrastructure investment in public sector was only 4.64 percent of GDP compared to 
private corporate investment at 6 percent of GDP. Noninfrastructure investment in the 
public sector also had a similar crossover in 1991–92. After the crossover, private 
corporate investment reached a peak of 9.34 percent of GDP in 1996–97 when public 
infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment were as low as 3.84 percent and 3.82 
percent of GDP, respectively. 
  Apart from public investment, the other potential determinants of private corporate 
investment are output gap, rate of interest, and quantity of credit (equation 11). The 
stylized facts related to these determinants are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
3.2  Private Investment and Output Expectations 
Output expectations as a determinant of private investment emanates from the accelerator 
theories of investment. Consistent with the flexible accelerator models of investment 
behavior, a priori, we expect that private corporate investment is determined by the output 
expectations in the economy, which, in turn, is represented most closely by the level of 
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OG=[(Actual GDP-Potential GDP)/Potential GDP] *100        (12)  
 
This is also known as the “economic activity index” (Congdon 1998; Tanzi 1985). 
It can be seen from equation (12) that the “output gap,” or the index of economic activity, 
is defined as the difference between the actual and trend/potential level of national output 
as a percentage of trend/potential output.  
Definitionally speaking, the potential level of output would be higher than the 
actual, as the resource utilization is maximized at the potential level. However, it is argued 
that cyclical factors, such as a recession or boom, could cause the actual to be below or 
above the potential output, respectively (Tanzi 1985). The major problem of estimation of 
the “output gap” lies on the estimation of potential level of output.
11 
 














                                                             
11 Theoretically, the “production function method” estimates the trend/potential output by determining the 
quantity and productivity of inputs, viz., labor and capital. The relative importance of the two inputs are 
determined by assuming that their return is determined by their marginal products and their share in the 
national output is equal to their quantity multiplied by the return (Adams and Coe 1990; Congdon 1998). 
Trend output estimation through the “production function method” requires data on labor force and capital 
stock. If data on one or both of these series are not available, one has to search for other methods of 
estimation of trend output. One of the most commonly used methods of estimation of trend output is the 
“moving average method.” Another method, known as “trend through peaks” (hereafter, TTP), was 
developed by Klein with Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. The steps involved in estimation are 
delineated below. The first step is to plot the data on GDP adjusted for price fluctuations and identify the 
peaks. Second, it is assumed that identified peaks in the series are the points where resources in the economy 
are used at 100 percent of their capacity. The third step is to intrapolate between the major peaks, including 
the first and last observation. The strong assumptions beneath the TTP method itself deterred us from using 
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The Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) is the method used in this paper for the 
derivation of the potential output. The idea of this filter is to decompose a nonstationary 
time series, such as actual output, into a stationary cyclical component and a smooth trend 
component (Yt and Yt
* denote the logarithms of actual and trend/potential output 
respectively) by minimizing the variance of the cyclical component subject to a penalty for 
the variation in the second difference of the trend component. This results in the following 






















t Y Y Y Y Y Y Min λ      (13) 
 
The first term in the equation is a measure of fit. The second term is a measure of 
smoothness. The Langrange multiplier (λ) is associated with the smoothness constraint 
and must be set a priori. As a weighting factor, it determines how smooth the resulting 
output series is. The lower the λ, the closer potential output follows actual output. Figure 4 
traces the path of actual and potential output in India.  
The comovements of private corporate investment and output gap are given in 
Figure 5. The plot revealed that the series have shown a significant crossover in the mid-
1980s. After the crossover, private corporate investment increased to a peak of 9 percent 
of GDP in mid-1990s before it began to decline to around 4 percent of GDP in 2002–03.  
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It is difficult to decipher from the plots whether output gap and private corporate 
investment are positively or negatively related. The broad trend noted from the plot is that 
movements of private investment have been countercyclical to output gap with a distinct 
crossover in mid-1980s. 
 
3.3   Private Corporate Investment and Price vs. Quantity of Credit 
With regard to availability of financing, a hypothesis emerged in recent years that, in 
contrast to developed countries, one of the principal constraints on investment in 
developing countries is the quantity, rather than cost, of the financial resources. This view 
is associated with McKinnon (1973) in his controversial work, Money and Capital in 
Economic Development. Mc Kinnon (1973) was the first to challenge the conventional 
wisdom intrinsic in the Keynesian and neoclassical models that investment is interest rate 
sensitive and a low interest rate would promote investment spending and economic growth 
in developed and developing countries (Molho 1986).
12  It is noted that one of the 
principal constraints on investment in developing countries is the quantity, rather than the 
cost, of financial resources and it would be legitimate to hypothesize that a private investor 
in a developing country is restricted by the level of bank financing (Blejer and Khan 
1984). The variable “availability of credit” is taken in the form of annual growth rate of 
outstanding credit from the banking sector to the commercial sector. This variable is 
included in our study to understand whether it is the credit that gets rationed in the 
investment decisions in India. It is to be noted that moral hazards and adverse selection 
problems can lead to credit rationing since the riskiness of investments cannot be 
identified a priori (Stigliz and Weiss 1981).  
In order to analyze whether there is any impact of the cost of funds (i.e., the impact 
of rate of interest) on private corporate investment, the study encountered the problem of 
selecting appropriate interest rates among the plethora of available interest rates in the 
financial market. The real Prime Lending Rate was selected from the spectrum of rates of 
interest in India due to its relevance in determining the investment process in the economy. 





                                                             
12 Shaw (1973) also challenged the conventional wisdom that low interest rates are adopted in the countries 
as a way of promoting economic growth. A detailed discussion of various rationale for a policy of low 
interest rates is given in Shaw (1973).   14
According to the Fisher hypothesis, the nominal rate of interest (γ
n) is given by  
 
γ
n =  γ 
r + π
e (ex ante equation) 
 
γ
n =  γ 




r is the ex ante real rate of interest; π
e and π are, respectively, the expected and real 
rate of inflation. The real rate of interest in any period is thus postulated to evolve as a 
deviation between the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation (WPI). The ex ante 
real rate of interest is derived by subtracting the expected rate of inflation from the 
nominal rate of interest. The ex ante real rate of interest and nominal rate of interest 
showed a sticky nonvarying nature over the time period, though the real rate of interest 
(which is the difference between nominal rate of interest and nominal rate of inflation) 
showed considerable variations in the intertemporal scale, which motivated the study to 
use the real rate of interest for the analysis.  
The comovements of cost and quantity of credit with private corporate investment 
(as a percent of GDP) are given in Figure 6. The plots revealed the negative relationship 
between the real rate of interest and private corporate investment; especially in the mid-
1990s, private investment declined monotonically while the real rate of interest remained 
high, around a range of 8–10 percent with mild fluctuations. 
 






























70 75 80 85 90 95 00












70 75 80 85 90 95 00
private corporate availability of credit   15
The rate of growth of bank credit (nonfood credit) to the commercial sector has 
shown violent fluctuations, especially since mid-1980s. A subtle positive correlation can 
be deciphered from the coplots of private corporate investment and the growth rate of 
credit, especially in the mid-1990s, which testified a falling private investment and lower 
growth rate of credit to the commercial sector. 
 
3.4  Set of Stylized Facts 
Before going for the econometric estimation of the model, this section attempts a quick 
recap of the stylized facts derived from the theoretical discussions above. The direct 
crowding out (or crowding in) can be captured from the substitution (or complementary) 
relationships between public and private spending that occur—not through changes in 
prices, interest rates, or required rate of return by changes in public sector activity, but 
through public sector consumption/investment being an argument in private utility 
functions and through the public sector capital stock being an argument in private sector 
production functions.
13 A priori, we anticipate a positive or negative sign for the public 
investment variables. 
Furthermore, cost and quantity of credit variables are included in the model 
specification to examine the validity of the McKinnon hypothesis in an Indian context, 
whether it is the quantity of credit that gets rationed and not the cost of credit that matters 
for private investment in developing countries. This hypothesis may be set against the 
backdrop of the recent trends of banks in investing above the SLR (Statutory Liquidity 
Ratio) requirements in India. A priori, the real rate of interest is expected to have a 
negative sign and availability of the credit to have a positive sign in determining private 
capital formation. The sign of macroeconomic activity proxied by output gap is expected, 
a priori, to be positive or negative depending on whether the investment decisions in India 
are procyclical or countercyclical. 
 
Ipvt = f { Ipub,   ir,   Cpvt, Y*} 
 
  (+/-),    (-),  (+),  (+/-) 
 
                                                             
13 While financial crowding out is defined as the consequences of public actions that affect private behavior, 
either by altering budget constraints or by influencing the prices faced by private agents, viz. rate of interest 
(Buiter 1990). In other words, financial crowding out is based on the notion that deficit spending not 
accompanied by new issuances of money carries with it the need for government to float debt issues that 
compete with the private debt instruments in financial markets (Blinder and Solow 1973). The resulting 
upward pressure on interest rates will reduce any private expenditure, which is interest rate sensitive.  
   16
4. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 
 
Prima facie, it is difficult to understand from the plots whether the macroseries under 
consideration are stationary or not. It is equally difficult to arrive at the conclusion 
whether these macroseries have stable long-run relationships with private corporate 
investment. In this section, these issues will be dealt with econometrically through the 
pretests of unit roots (with structural breaks) and cointegration before proceeding to the 
model estimation. This paper used Hsiao’s methodology for model estimation because it 
has the advantage of judicious parametrisation of lag structure using Akaike’s final 
prediction error when compared to Sims-Granger framework of causality. Also, this VAR-
FPE approach does not infect the model with spurious restrictions on variables.  
 
4.1  Checking for Stationarity of Series: Unit Root Tests with Structural Break 
Testing of unit root involves the testing of order of integration of the data series. A series 
Xt is said to be integrated of order d, denoted by  
Xt∼It  (d)      (14) 
 
If it becomes stationary after differentiating d times, Xt contains d unit roots. Using the 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) methodology,
14 the fundamental regression equation to 








1 1 2 1 0     (15) 
 
The null hypothesis of unit root is accepted if a2=0. If the null hypothesis a = a2 = 0 
is rejected, the series is trend stationary. However, the unit root test in the presence of an 
astructural break is different from simple ADF test. Based on ADF equation, Perron 
(1989) developed a method to test unit roots incorporating structural change. Perron’s 
procedure for unit roots based on modified ADF is as follows: 
 
                                                             
14 One of the major problems of the ADF test is the selection of appropriate lag length. Including too many 
lags reduces the power of the test to reject the null hypothesis since the increased number of lags requires the 
estimation of additional parameters and loss of degrees of freedom. On the other hand, too few lags would 
not capture the actual error process and would fail to give a proper estimate (Enders 1995). We followed the 
approach suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) for the selection of appropriate lag length; that is, to 
start with a relatively long lag length and pare down to the model by the usual t-test and/or F-test. Thus, one 
can estimate the equation using a lag length of n*. If the t-statistics are insignificant in the lag n*, repeat the 
procedure until the last lag becomes significant.    17
H0: yt =a0 +y t-1 +µ 1Dp + µ2DL +εt                  (16) 
 
where Dp =1 for t=τ +1 and 0 otherwise; and D L =1 for t > τ and 0 otherwise. The 
structural break is assumed to have occurred at τ. The appropriate alternative hypothesis in 
this case is 
 
A0: yt = a0 + at +µ2DL + µ3DT* t +εt      (17) 
 
where DT = t -τ for t > τ and 0 otherwise. In other words, the alternative hypothesis is that 
the series is stationary around the trend, and the slope and intercept of the trend line 
change at t= τ +1. 
Perron (1989) suggested a two-step procedure for testing unit roots in the presence 
of structural break. 
Step 1: Detrend the data by estimating the alternative hypothesis and calling the 
residual 
r
t y . 




t y a y ε + = −1 2  
If the errors from this second regression equation do not appear to be white noise, 
estimate the equation in the form of augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The t-statistic for the 
null hypothesis can be compared to the McKinnon critical values. 
We assume a break for the macrovariables in 1991. The significance of a break in 
the trend is ascertained in terms of a Chow test. The results of the Chow test in terms of F-
Statistic and Log Likelihood statistic revealed that all macrovariables exhibited a break in 
the trend in 1991 (Table 1).  
 










Private Corporate Investment  1991  5.36  0.0100  10.39  0.0056 
Public Investment   1991  39.85  0.0000  43.60  0.0000 
Real rate of interest  1991  48.19  0.0000  48.31  0.0000 
Output Gap  1991  14.24  0.0000  22.57  0.0000 
Public Infrastructure Investment  1991  4.67  0.0175  9.21  0.0100 
Public Noninfrastructure Investment   1991  4.01  0.0290  8.06  0.0178 
Nonfood Credit  1991  21.06  0.0000  29.61  0.0000 
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The next step is to test for unit roots incorporating the structural break in 1991. The 
results of unit root tests incorporating the structural break of private corporate investment 
and its a priori determinants based on Perron’s methodology are presented in the Table 2. 
There is no problem of seasonality as it is annual data.  
 




ADF test statistics 
First-difference 
(without  trend) 
Order of integration 
Private Corporate Investment  1991  -8.028  I ~ (1)  at 1% 
Public Investment   1991  -8.190  I ~ (1)  at 1% 
Real rate of interest  1991  -7.767  I ~ (1)  at 1% 
Output Gap  1991  -5.874  I ~ (1)  at 1% 
Public Infrastructure Investment  1991  -10.670  I ~ (1) at 1% 
Public Noninfrastructure Investment   1991  -9.1798  I ~ (1)  at 1 % 
Non-food Credit  1991  -8.967  I ~ (1) at 1 % 
Note: The Campbell and Perron (1991) method is used for selecting the appropriate lags. Critical levels for first 
difference without trend are –2.6423 (1% level). Source for critical values: MacKinnon (1991) 
 
All the variables are found stationary in first differences without trend. Dickey 
Fuller statistics thus imply that all variables are integrated of order one, that is, I ~ (1). 
 
4.2 Testing for Cointegration: Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood Approach 
Having established that macrovariables are nonstationary and have same order of 
integration at I ~ (1), we test whether the linear combination of these macroseries is 
stationary, that is, they are cointegrated. Cointegration is a test for equilibrium between 
nonstationary variables integrated of the same order. In case of multivariate models, 
Johansen’s cointegration test is superior to Engle-Granger cointegration methodology for 
three reasons. First, the Johansen and Juselius method tests for all the number of 
cointegrating vectors between the variables based on the trace statistic test. Second, it 
treats all variables as endogenous, thus avoiding an arbitrary choice of dependent variable. 
Third, it provides a unified framework for estimating and testing cointegrating relations 
within the framework of a vector error correction model (VECM).
15   
Johansen-Juselius tried to develop a methodology, as follows, to study the long-
run relationship among nonstationary variables. Let us define zt as “n” potentially 
endogeneous variables and model zt as an unrestricted VAR of k lags, 
 
 
                                                             
15 Gonzalo (1994) also pointed out that the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure for cointegration is a 
better technique compared to single equation methods and alternative multivariate methods.   19
zt = A1zt-1 +-------------- + Akzt-k + ut       where       ut ~ IN (0  ∑)          (18) 
 
 
where  zt is (n x 1) and each of the Ai is an (n x n) matrix of parameters.
16  
  Equation (15) can be reformulated into a vector error correction (VECM) form: 
   
  
1 1 z z z t k t t t + Π + − − − − − − + ∆ Γ = ∆ − − µ
 (19) 
 
where Γi = -(I-A1 - ------- - Ai), (I – A1 - ……………….. – Ak).  
 
and Πi= -(I-A1- ………………… - Ak). 
 
  Equation (16) contains information on both the short-run and long-run adjustment 
to changes in zt, via the estimates of  i
^
Γ  and 
^
Π , respectively. As shown in Johansen 
(1988), Π = αβ`, where α represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium, while β is 
a matrix of long-run coefficients, such that the term β`zt-k represents up to n-1 
cointegrating relationships in the multivariate model, which ensure that the zt converge to 
their long-run, steady-state solution.
17  
  We have used a trace ((λtrace) test of the stochastic matrix to determine the number 
of cointegrating relationships, which is defined as follows: 






trace T r ∑
+ =




                                                             
16 This type of VAR-model is to estimate dynamic relationships among jointly endogenous variables without 
imposing strong a priori restrictions (such as particular structural relationships and/or exogeneity of some of 
the variables). The system is in reduced form with each variable in zt regressed on only lagged values of 
both itself and all other variables in the system. Thus, OLS is an efficient way to estimate each equation 
comprising (i) since the right hand side of each equation in the system comprises a common set of (lagged 
and thus, predetermined) regressors (Harris 1995).  
17 Assuming that zt is a vector of nonstationary I(1) variables, then all the terms in (16) that involve ∆ zt-i are 
I(0). We need to have ut as I~(0) for existence of a long-run relationship. This can happen only when Π zt-k is 
stationary, which can be met in three instances: when all variables in zt are in fact stationary. The second 
instance when there is no cointegration, that is, Π is a (n x n) matrix of zeros. The third way for Π zt-k to be I 
~ (0) is when there exists up to (n-1) cointegration relationship: β`zt-k ~ I (0). In this instance, r ≤ (n-1) 
cointegration vectors exist in β (that is, r columns of  β form r linearly dependent combinations of variables, 
each of which is stationary), together with (n-r) nonstationary vectors (that is, n-r columns of β form I ~ (1) 
common trends.). Only the cointegrating vectors enter equation (ii), otherwise Π zt-k would not be I ~ (0), 
which implies that (n-r) columns of α are effectively zero. The problem of estimating the number of 
cointegrating vector in a multivariate system boils down to estimating the rank of Π matrix.  
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where λi = estimated values of the characteristic roots (also called eigen values) obtained 
from the estimated  π matrix; to the generalized eigen value problem 
0 0
1
00 0 = −
−
k k skk S S S λ
 
where the matrices Sij  are the residual moment matrices obtained from  equation (19) and  
T = the number of usable observations.  
The empirical process of Johansen’s cointegration involves the following three 
steps. The first step involves the determination of the optimum lag of VAR. This involves 
the estimation of the first differenced variables of the VAR with alternative lag lengths. 
The AIC, SBC, and the likelihood ratio test collectively suggest an optimal lag length of 
one.  
 
Table 3: Cointegration Tests Based on Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood Method 








I  *} , , , { Y C i I f I pvt r pub pvt =  
  0    98.365   59.46   66.52 
  1   52.761   39.89   45.58 
  2   26.455   24.31   29.75 
  3   8.423   12.53   16.31 
  4   0.0523    3.84    6.51 
II  *} , , { , inf Y C i I I pvt r ra pvt =  
  0    77.949   59.46   66.52 
  1   48.231   39.89   45.58 
  2   26.380   24.31   29.75 
  3   7.405   12.53   16.31 
  4   2.632    3.84    6.51 
III  *} , , { , inf Y C i I I pvt r ra non pvt =  
  0    88.539   59.46   66.52 
  1   51.632   39.89   45.58 
  2   26.850   24.31   29.75 
  3   5.9454   12.53   16.31 
  4   2.050    3.84    6.51 
 
The second step involves the selection of deterministic terms in VAR. The data 
reveal no quadratic trend, though there is linear trend. This implies an intercept in VAR, 
but no trend. The third step involves the estimation of the cointegrating equations using 
Johansen’s likelihood ratio trace ((λtrace) criterion. Using nondeterministic trends, the λ- 
trace test suggested that the rank (number of cointegrating vectors) is three for all the three 
models (Table 3).  
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4.3 Causality Detection  
As the macrovariables are tested for the order of integration and cointegration, the next 
task that follows the logical order is to detect the direction of the causality between the 
variables. Xt is a Granger cause of Yt (denoted as Xt ⇒Yt) if Yt can be predicted with 
accuracy by using past values of X t rather than by not doing so, other information being 
identical (Granger 1969). 
 The appropriate parametrisation of the model manifests the critical part of 
Granger-causality test, as the results depend on the lag length chosen. Arbitrary or ad hoc 
parametrisation can lead to econometric problems. Underparametrisation may lead to 
estimation bias and overparametrisation results in the loss of degrees of freedom and thus, 
the power of the test.
18  
Hsiao’s (1981) method is one of the alternatives to unconstrained Sims-type 
symmetric VAR.
19 Hsiao’s procedure starts from univariate autoregression and 
sequentially adds lags and variables using Akaike’s (1969) Final Prediction Error 
criterion. This asymmetric VAR model, using FPE criterion to select the appropriate lag 
specification, takes care of parametrically prolific symmetric VAR models. An advantage 
of Hsiao (1981) asymmetric VAR is that, along with the appropriate parametrisation, we 
can detect the causality of the variables also in the autoregressive framework. Asymmetric 
VAR models permit more flexibility in modeling dynamic systems. In asymmetric VAR, 
each equation has the same explanatory variables, but each variable may have a different 
number of lags. Hsiao noted that “FPE criteria is appealing since it balances the risk due to 
the bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to the increase of variance when a 
higher order is selected.” And by combining final prediction error criterion and Grangers’ 
(1969) definition of causality, a practical method for identification of the system of 
equations was suggested.  
                                                             
18 On the basis of parametrisation, vector autoregressive modeling can be of two types. The first type of 
VAR model is standard Sims-type VAR model in which every variable enters every equation with the same 
lag length. This is a symmetric VAR model since it employs symmetrical lag specifications. The second type 
is the asymmetric VAR model. The asymmetric VAR model is defined as a VAR where each variable may 
have a unique number of lags. The advantage of asymmetric VAR over symmetric VAR is that the latter 
employs the same lag length for each variable, exhausts considerable degrees of freedom, and, consequently, 
often estimates many statistically insignificant coefficients.  
19 Litterman (1986) used Bayesian vector autoregressive model, which is another alternative to symmetric 
VAR. Hsiaos’ (1981) asymmetric VAR has an advantage against Littermans’ Bayesian VAR. Litterman 
imposes Bayesian prior restrictions on VAR coefficients. Since these prior restrictions are almost always 
based on forecasting performance instead of economic theory, parameter estimates from Bayesian VARs are 
likely to be biased. Bias may be acceptable in forecasting, but biased structural parameters estimates are 
undesirable if the goal is to answer questions about macroeconomic structure and the channels of operation 
of a macrovariable (Keating 2000).  
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Vector autoregression models can be written in general form as 
 
t t t y L y µ ψ α + + = ) (                             (20) 
 
where y t   is vector of model variables  
that is, (first difference of (Ipub), (Og) (ir), (∆ Cpvt), (er) 
α  is a vector of constants, 
µ t is a vector of white noise error terms, and 










ψ  where L is the lag operator and µ t  and ν t  are white noise error 
terms. 
To choose the order of lags in ψ ii (L) and ψ ij (L) by the minimum FPE is 
equivalent to applying an approximate F-test with varying significance levels (Hsiao 















=        (21) 
 
where T = the number of observations, 
          m = order of lags of y, 
          n = the order of lags xs, 













t − Ψ − Ψ − =∑
=
σ       (22) 
 
where superscripts m and n denote the order of lags in  ψ 11 (L)  and ψ 12(L). 
(L), ψ 
n
12 (L) xs t, and a^ are the least-square estimates. The causality can be 
detected as follows: If FPE y (m, n) < FPE y (m, 0) then x(s)t Granger causes yt, denoted by 
x(s)t ⇒ yt. 
The final prediction error (FPE) of fitting one dimensional autoregressive process 
for private corporate investment is computed with upper bound of lag length (L
*), assumed 
to be equal to 5 in all the models discussed in the paper. Firstly, we considered private 
corporate investment as a controlled variable, holding the order of its autoregressive 
operator to one, based on FPE criteria; we sequentially added the lags of the manipulated  
variables, such as public investment, real rate of interest, output gap, availability of credit  
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to private sector, and exchange rate up to the L
* of 5 and found the respective order that 
gives the smallest FPE.  
 
Table 4: Public Investment–Private Investment Models: Results: Hsiao (1981) 
Detection of Optimal Lags of the Manipulated Variables and FPE of the Controlled 
Variable: 1970–71 to 2002–03 
Controlled 
Variable 







    Causality   
     Inference 
Model I 
Ipvt (1)        -  -     0.0858    - 
Ipvt  (1)  (ir- πt)  -  -    1     0.0611          (ir- πt) ⇒ Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipub  -    1     0.0409         Ipub ⇒ Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipub  Og    1     0.1004         Og ≠ Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipub  Og  Cpvt  1     0.0337         Cpvt⇒  Ipvt 
Model II 
Ipvt (1)  -  -  -  -  -                   - 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  -  -  -  1     0.0611         (ir- πt) ⇒ Ipvt  
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipubinfra  -  -  1     0.0573         Ipubinfra ⇒ Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipubinfra  Cpvt  -  1     0.1164         Cpvt  ≠ Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipubinfra  Cpvt  Og  1     0.0998         Og ≠ Ipvt 
Model III 
Ipvt (1)  -  -  -  -  -    - 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  - -  -  1     0.0611         (ir- πt) ⇒ Ipvt  
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipubnoninfra  -  -  1     0.0553        Ipubnoninfra  ⇒ Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipubnoninfra  Cpvt  -  1     0.0502         Cpvt ⇒Ipvt 
Ipvt (1)  (ir- πt)  Ipubnoninfra  Cpvt  Og  1     0.0866        Og ≠  Ipvt 
Note: Figures in the parentheses denote the lag length of the controlled variable. 
Source (Basic Data): National Account Statistics, New Series, CSO (various issues) and Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy, RBI (various issues). 
 
The order in which the variables enter into the equation is as per the specific 
gravity criteria.
20 As per the specific gravity criteria, the explanatory variables are 
sequenced as follows in Model 1: real interest rate, public investment, output gap, and 
finally, credit availability to private sector. The results showed that private corporate 
investment is sensitive to cost and quantity of credit, as well as public investment.  
                                                             
20 Caines, Kend, and Sethi (1981) suggested the following specific gravity criteria methodology for 
multivariate autoregressive modeling for stationary processes: (I) For a pair of stationary processes (X, Y) 
construct bivariate AR models of different orders, then compare the multivariate final prediction errors of 
these models, and choose the model of order k possessing minimum FPE to be the optimal model for the pair 
of processes (X, Y); (II) Construct bivariate AR (k) models [both causal models and noncausal 
(independent) models] for (X, Y) and apply the stage-wise causality detection procedure to determine the 




n, we rank these multiple causal variables according to the decreasing order of 
their specific gravities; (IV) For each caused (endogenous) process, X, we first construct the optimal 
univariate AR model using FPE criterion, then we include X’s multiple causal variables, one at a time, 
according to their causal ranks and use FPE criterion to determine the optimal orders of the model at each 
step; (V) Pool all the optimal univariate AR models constructed in (IV) and estimate the system.    24
When the model is respecified using public infrastructure (instead of public 
investment) the results do not move in tandem with the public investment model.
21 
However, the specific gravity criterion of sequencing the variables into the equation 
suggested that the real rate of interest and public infrastructure investment entered the 
equation prior to the variables that capture the quantity of credit and output gap. The 
results suggest that public sector capital formation in infrastructure and real rate of interest 
proved to be the effective causal factors of private corporate investment, while the output 
gap and availability of credit were not the causal variables of the private capital formation 
in the corporate sector.  
Similarly, the model is respecified using public noninfrastructure (instead of 
public investment).
22 Theoretically, considerable ambiguity remains in the direction of the 
magnitude of public noninfrastructure investment and private capital formation, especially 
in the context of developing countries. If the government invests in these sectors, which 
are of a competing nature with private firms, it may lead to crowding out of private 
investment. At the same time, private firms operate on a level playing field provided by the 
government in the investible sectors and the government continues investing in 
noninfrastructure projects, like manufacturing, finance and insurance, business services, 
etc. A healthy coexistence of private and public sector investment can be, a priori, 
expected. It is therefore important to econometrically investigate whether public 
noninfrastructure investments have mutually reinforcing effects on private corporate 
investment or substitution effects. The analysis showed that public noninfrastructure 
investment is found to be significant in determining private corporate investment. 
Moreover, the cost of credit rather than quantity of credit are also found to be significant.  
 
4.5  Error Correction Models 
In addition to detection of causality, the sign and magnitude of the causal relationship 
between private corporate investment and other macrovariables are also of great 
significance in understanding the mechanism of the crowding-out phenomenon. The 
evidence of cointegration implies the error correction modeling of private corporate 
                                                             
21 Johansen’s FIML estimates of cointegration based on maximum eigen value tests and trace tests revealed 
that there are two cointegrating equations when public infrastructure investment is included in the model 
instead of public investment. The order of cointegrating VAR is detected to be one and the models estimated 
on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of deterministic trends showed that the rank is two. 
22 The pretest of Johansen’s FIML estimates based on maximum eigen value test and trace test for the model 
respecified using public noninfrastructure investment suggested that there are, at the most, two cointegrating 
vectors as the rank is detected as two. The order of cointegrating VAR is detected to be one and the models 
estimated on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of deterministic trends showed that the rank is two.    25
investment, which combines both the long-run information and short-run dynamics in the 
equation.  
The evidence from the equation, inclusive of error correction term (ecm) and a 
dummy (D91) for stabilization and structural adjustment reforms since 1991, revealed that 
public investment affects private capital formation in India (Model 1). There is no 
evidence of direct crowding out of private corporate investment by public investment; 
instead it is observed that a one percent increase in public capital formation increased 
private capital formation in the corporate sector by 1.48 percent. The dummy for structural 
adjustment has been found to be significant. The estimated coefficient value of the error 
correction term of 0.322 is found significant, which suggests that the system corrects its 
previous period’s disequilibrium by 32 percent. The estimated equation reinforced the 
rejection of the McKinnon hypothesis; as both cost and quantity of credit does matter for 
the capital formation in the private corporate sector in India. Though partial evidence for 
financial crowding out is revealed through a negative significant relationship between real 
rate of interest and private corporate investment, the confirmation of financial crowding 
out can be detected only after checking whether the real interest rate is induced by fiscal 
deficit operations of the government. Before going into this analysis, it is imperative to 
analyze the link between private corporate investment and public investment based on the 
nonhomogeneity of public capital formation in India.  
The evidence from Model (2) revealed that public infrastructure investment 
crowds in public investment; the magnitude of the effect is also substantial—that a one 
percent rise in public infrastructure investment crowds in 1.89 percent of private corporate 
investment. All other variables are found insignificant when public infrastructure is 
incorporated in the model instead of aggregate public investment. This result interprets 
that if public infrastructure is provided, investment decisions of the private corporate 
sector do not depend on quantity and cost of credit.  
 The evidence from Model (3) revealed that cost, as well as quantity, of credit are 
significant determinants of private corporate investment. No substitution effects are 
observed between public noninfrastructure investment and private investment; rather the 
results show that a one percent increase in public capital formation in noninfrastructural 
sectors increased the private capital formation in the corporate sector by 1.64 percent. The 
coefficient of the error correction term is found insignificant in the model, however the 
value of ecm suggests that the system needs to adjust upward by 15 percent to restore 
long-run equilibrium.   26
The above models of public (infrastructure and noninfrastructure) investment 
showed that there is no evidence of direct crowding out of private corporate investment by 
public investment. But the confirmation of no financial crowding out can be detected only 
after checking whether the rise in real interest rate is induced by fiscal deficit operations of 
the government.  
 
Table 5: Error Correction Models 
 c  ∆Ipvt(t-1)  ∆Ipub(t-1)  ∆Ipubinfra(t-1)  ∆Ipubnoninf
ra(t-1) 























































Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 1 %, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
However, it is to be noted that the complicated dynamics of a VAR make direct 
interpretation of coefficients difficult. The solution is to examine the impulse responses. 
Impulse response functions are the dynamic simulations based on the estimated 
coefficients of VAR, which will be dealt in the following section. 
 
4.6  Innovation Accounting: Impulse Response Functions 
An impulse response function (IRF) traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock to 
one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables through 
the dynamic structure of the VAR. The phenomenon of real crowding out can be detected 
through the dynamic effect of a unit (one standard deviation) increase of public investment 
on the (expected) future values of private corporate investment. IRF results of the reaction 
of private corporate investment to shocks in public investment support the nonoccurrence 
of crowding out. A unit policy shock to public investment increases private corporate 
investment by 0.04 in the initial year after the innovation, and it steadily increases and 
reaches 0.21 percentage points by the end of decadal simulations (Figure 7a).  
  The differential impacts of public infrastructure and noninfrastruture innovations 
on the private corporate sector are carried out separately to analyze the nonhomogeneity 
aspects of public investment. It is revealed that public infrastructure investment has more 
powerful effects than noninfrastructure. Private corporate investment reacts to a one   27
standard deviation shock to public infrastructure investment by a rise of 0.14 in the initial 
year and monotonically increases by 0.178 percentage points in ten years (Figure 7b); 
while responses of private corporate investment to noninfrastructure investment by the 
government would be only by 0.005 points in the initial year after the shock and rise 
meagerly to 0.06 by the end of decade (Figure 7c). These results of IRF reinforce that 
public investment—in particular, public infrastructure investment—crowds in private 
corporate investment in the medium and long terms, which has significant policy 
implications.  
  The dynamic simulations of private corporate investment to other macrovariables, 
including cost and quantity of credit and output expectations, revealed that the magnitude 
of no other variables has been as significant as public investment in determining private 
corporate investment. Only one exception noted is in Model (3), where the innovations to 
private corporate investment through the availability of credit (0.13) are more than that of 
noninfrastructure investment (0.06) at the end of decadal dynamic simulations (Fig 7c). 
However, the dynamic simulations revealed that these credit-related innovations are found 
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4.7  Evidence for Financial Crowding Out  
Financial crowding out is advanced in literature through the testing of the causal link 
between fiscal deficit and rate of interest (Kotlikoff 1984). He further pointed out that 
much of the concerns with “financial crowding out” revolve around the transaction of 
selling bonds to finance fiscal deficit. As argument goes, a government’s sale of bonds, 
regardless of its use of the proceeds, raises the total supply of bonds in the market. The 
greater supply of bonds (according to this view) means a lower bond price, that is, a higher 
interest rate, which reduces (crowds out) private investment. The real rate of interest (R-π)t 
model is specified for India in an open economy macroframework where interest rate is 
determined by fiscal, monetary, and external factors. The determinants identified are 
expected rate of inflation (π
e
t), growth of money supply (δM3t), fiscal deficit (DEFt), and 
exchange rate ($ert).
23 The optimal parameterization of variables through the final 
prediction criteria suggested that the lag structure of controlled and manipulated variables 
is one. Also, the specific gravity criteria for ordering the variables in the model allowed 
the entry of monetary variables prior to the entry of fiscal variables in the interest rate 
model.  
 
Table 6: Real Rate of Interest Model: Hsiao (1981) Detection of Optimal Lags of the 
Manipulated Variables and FPE of the Controlled Variable 
Controlled 
Variable 








(R-π)t (1)  - -  -  -  - 3.287602   
(R-π)t  (1)  $ert -  -  -  1  3.173645  $ert ⇒ (R-π)t  
(R-π)t (1)  $ert  π
e
t  - -  1  3.235383  π
e
t ⇒ (R-π)t  
(R-π)t (1)  $ert  π
e
t  δM3t  - 1  3.208523  δM3t ⇒(R-π)t  
(R-π)t (1)  $ert  π
e
t  ∆ δM3t  DEFt 1  3.452459  DEFt  ≠ (R-π)t  
Note: Figures in the parentheses denote the lag length of controlled variable. 
 
The results shown in Table 6 reinforce the absence of financial crowding out in 
India, as fiscal deficit is found insignificant in determining the real rate of interest. Instead, 
the results show that the real rate of interest is affected by expected inflation, change in 
money supply, and the exchange rate in an open economy macromodel. 
  Quite contrary to the crowding out debate, the analysis shows no significant 
relationship between fiscal deficit and rate of interest in India. As price expectations are 
                                                             
23 Chakraborty (2006) discusses the theoretical underpinnings of these determinants of rate of interest in 
detail.   32
found to be significant in determining rate of interest, the macroeconomic fundamentals 




The results suggest that there is no evidence of direct crowding out of private capital 
formation by public investment in India. The impact of nonhomogeneity of public capital 
formation in India on private capital formation is analyzed through public infrastructure 
and noninfrastructure investment, and found that the former has a complementary 
relationship with private corporate investment and no evidence of direct (real) crowding 
out in India. Furthermore, in determining private capital formation, rate of interest is found 
to be significant.
24  
Though there is no evidence of direct crowding out of private corporate investment 
by public investment, the confirmation of no financial crowding out can be detected only 
after analyzing whether the real interest rate rise is induced by fiscal deficit operations of 
the government. If the real rate of interest is not induced by fiscal deficit, then no evidence 
for the occurrence of financial crowding out though private corporate investment is 
interest rate sensitive. The results showed that rate of interest is not induced by the fiscal 
operations of the government. 
The reasons for no crowding out—direct and financial—may be threefold. One of 
the plausible reasons for no crowding out in the context of India can be explained from the 
pattern of savings in the economy, especially that of the households, which has moved in 
favor of financial assets.
25 The conjecture is that the compositional shift in savings in India 
towards financial assets could moderate the crowding out effects as it increases the 
loanable funds in the economy and, thereby, imparting less pressure on rate of interest.
26 
The second reason could be that the increase in financial resources raised through capital 
markets during the 1980s, in addition to the bank credit to private sector, give an 
                                                             
24 This result of rate of interest being a significant determinant of private investment is in confirmation with  
certain studies on crowding out in the context of developing countries, including India. For instance, Shafik 
(1992) in the context of Italy and Parker (1995) in the context of India.  
 
25 The share of financial savings in gross domestic savings has increased from 20.62 percent in 1970–71 to 
48.93 percent in 1993–94, and then to 49.78 percent in 1998–99, immediately after a dip to 35.27 percent in 
1995–96. 
26 It is often argued that one of the principal constraints on investment in the developing countries where 
prices are administratively controlled is the credit rationing and, therefore, it would be legitimate to 
hypothesize that private investors in developing countries are restricted by the level of banking (Blejer and 
Khan 1984).    33
indication that the private corporate sector, on the aggregate, did not face a shortage of 
investible resources.
27 The third reason could be the overall liquidity in the system might 
not have pushed up the interest rate and, in turn, crowded out the private corporate 
investment.  
  The results of Impulse Response Function reinforce that no other macrovariables—
including cost of credit, quantity of credit, and the output gap—have been as significant as 
public investment—in particular, public infrastructure investment—in crowding in private 
corporate investment in the medium and long terms, which has crucial policy implications.  
                                                             
27 The financing of private corporate investment through corporate debentures increased from 696 million 
U.S. dollars in mid-1980s to 3,500 million U.S. dollars by the mid-1990s, and equity financing of private 
corporate investment increased from 77 million U.S. dollars in the late 1980s to around 5,000 million U.S. 
dollars by mid-1990s. Moreover, financing of the private corporate sector through commercial bank 
borrowing also increased from 9,473 million U.S. dollars in 1984–85 to 16,146 million U.S. dollars by 
1994–95 (for details, see Parker 1995).   34
Appendix 1: Selected Empirical Evidence on Crowding Out  
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Appendix 1: Selected Empirical Evidence on Crowding Out (cont'd) 
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